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Surveys of household finances reveal a striking fact: the share of wealth invested in stocks,
or risky assets more generally, rises in wealth. While poorer households are less likely to
participate in the stock market, this fact alone does not explain the positive relation between
wealth and the share of wealth invested in stocks (hereafter, the portfolio share). The port-
folio share rises in wealth even among stockholders. While more educated households tend
to have higher portfolio shares, the portfolio share rises in wealth even among stockholders
with the same education.
This paper examines the role that nonhomothetic utility plays in explaining the observed
relation between portfolio choice and wealth. We develop a life-cycle model in which the
household consumes two types of goods. The household’s utility function has higher cur-
vature over a “basic good” than over a “luxury good”. We calibrate and solve the model
with a labor-income process that is widely used in the life-cycle literature (e.g., Zeldes, 1989;
Carroll, 1997; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). We then simulate an economy of ex ante iden-
tical households who are subject to idiosyncratic income shocks. The model has four main
testable predictions for household consumption and portfolio choice.
The first prediction is that the expenditure share falls in total consumption for some
goods and rises for others. In the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, households with higher
permanent income allocate a lower share of their total consumption to the basic good. Using
household consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we identify basic goods
as those goods whose expenditure shares fall in total consumption. We find a significant
relation between the basic expenditure share and total consumption, even within the cross-
section of stockholders. We use the variation in the basic expenditure share to guide our
calibration of household preferences. Our empirical findings imply significant differences in
the utility curvature between basic and luxury goods.
The second prediction is that the portfolio share rises in wealth. In the nonhomothetic
life-cycle model, households with higher permanent income are less risk averse, and conse-
quently, allocate a higher share of their wealth to stocks. As in an otherwise similar model
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with homothetic utility, the nonhomothetic life-cycle model implies that the optimal port-
folio share falls in wealth, holding constant the level of permanent income. However, such
transitory variation in wealth is a less important determinant of portfolio choice than the
cross-sectional variation in permanent income, leading to a positive relation between the
portfolio share and wealth. We confirm this prediction with household portfolio data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances.1
The third prediction is that the portfolio share is relatively stable over the life cycle. In
the homothetic life-cycle model, the portfolio share falls in age because younger households
have greater incentive to diversify their large endowment of non-tradable human capital.
Although this incentive also operates in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, it is offset by a
rising life-cycle income profile, which causes risk aversion to fall in age. The nonhomothetic
life-cycle model therefore produces a flatter age profile in the portfolio share, which is more
consistent with the empirical evidence.
The fourth prediction is that, for a given household, the portfolio share can fall in response
to an increase in wealth. In the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, the portfolio share falls in the
ratio of wealth to permanent income but rises in permanent income itself. Put differently,
the portfolio share falls in response to transitory wealth shocks but rises in response to
permanent shocks. Therefore, a regression of changes in the portfolio share onto changes in
wealth generates a small negative coefficient in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008). Our findings suggest
that reduced form regressions are unlikely to be able to detect the presence of decreasing
relative risk aversion.
We build on an active literature that studies the consumption and portfolio implications
of life-cycle models with realistic labor-income processes. One branch of this literature
focuses on the life-cycle profile in wealth accumulation and portfolio choice (e.g., Bertaut
1The fact that the portfolio share rises in wealth has been documented in various household surveys.
Early empirical evidence can be found in the 1962 and 1963 Surveys of the Financial Characteristics of
Consumers and Changes in Family Finances (Blume and Friend, 1975; Friend and Blume, 1975). Guiso,
Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002, Table I.7) contains a summary of the international evidence for five countries.
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and Haliassos, 1997; Heaton and Lucas, 1997; Gakidis, 1998; Viceira, 2001; Davis and Willen,
2002; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). Another branch focuses on the potential role
that fixed costs play in explaining non-participation in the stock market. In particular,
Cocco (2005), Hu (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005) find that housing crowds out stocks
in the household’s portfolio and can explain non-participation in the presence of fixed costs.
Gomes and Michaelides (2005) find that low risk aversion, paired with a low elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, leads to a low saving motive and can explain non-participation
in the presence of fixed costs. Instead of non-participation, we focus on a puzzle that has
received relatively little attention: the fact that the portfolio share rises in wealth conditional
on participation.
Our work is also related to that of Carroll (2000, 2002), who proposes a model in which
wealth at the end of life is a luxury good. Carroll’s model has the potential to explain
the high saving rate and the portfolio behavior of the extremely wealthy (i.e., the top first
percentile of the wealth distribution).2 Luxury goods also play an important role in the work
of Äıt-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004), who develop a representative household model
with nonhomothetic utility over two goods. They find that the consumption of luxury
goods, constructed from data on the sales of luxury retailers, is consistent with the high
historical equity premium. Unlike these previous studies, this paper calibrates and solves a
life-cycle model to generate quantitatively testable implications for household consumption
and portfolio choice. In addition, while these previous studies have focused on households
at the extreme peak of the wealth distribution, our work aims to explain consumption and
portfolio choice for the entire cross-section of stockholders.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the empirical evidence
on household consumption, and Section 2 presents the empirical evidence on household port-
folio choice. Section 3 develops a life-cycle model with nonhomothetic utility and describes
2In related work, Roussanov (2010) develops a model in which the household’s preference for social status
is effectively a luxury good, which explains why wealthier households own portfolios with undiversified private
equity.
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the preference and income parameters used in the calibration. Section 4 solves the model
and describes the policy functions for consumption and portfolio choice. Section 5 compares
the consumption and portfolio behavior of simulated households to that of actual households
in the survey data. Section 6 concludes. The appendices contain details on the survey data
as well as numerical methods used to solve the life-cycle model.
1. Evidence on Household Consumption
1.1 Consumer Expenditure Survey
Data on consumption are from the repeated cross-section of U.S. households in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey for the period 1982–2003. We focus on the sub-sample of stockholders
in all of our analysis. Appendix A contains details on our use of the data, including a
description of the relevant categories of nondurable goods and services.
1.2 Basic versus luxury consumption
In this section, we use the tools of consumer demand analysis to categorize various non-
durable goods and services into basic and luxury goods (Working, 1943; Stone, 1954; Prais
and Houthakker, 1955; Leser, 1963). We estimate a censored regression model to character-
ize the relation between the expenditure share and total consumption for stockholders. The
outcome variable is the expenditure share for the various categories of nondurable goods
and services. The latent variable depends on age group, log total (nondurable and service)
consumption, log total consumption interacted with age group, marital status, household
size, and interview-year dummies. The omitted category is households with four members,
whose head is aged 46–55 and married. We use consumption instead of wealth as a regressor
because consumption data are more complete and reliable than financial data in the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey. However, we have verified that our main findings are robust to
using financial wealth.
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Table 1 reports our results for nondurable goods. For food at home, the coefficient on
log consumption is −8.05, which shows that its expenditure share falls in total consumption
for households aged 46–55. The magnitude of the coefficient means that, for an average
household aged 46–55, a 100% rise in total consumption is associated with a 8.05 percentage
point fall in the expenditure share. The coefficient on the interaction between log consump-
tion and age group is 0.50 for households aged 36–45, which implies a −8.05+ 0.50 = −7.55
percentage point change in the expenditure share for a 100% rise in total consumption. The
coefficient on the interaction between log consumption and age group is 0.28 for households
aged 56–65. In other words, the negative relation between the expenditure share for food
at home and total consumption is weaker for younger and older households, although these
differences are not statistically significant.
In contrast to food at home, food away from home as a share of total consumption rises
in total consumption within each age group. The fact that the expenditure share rises in
total consumption is consistent with introspection, which suggests that dining out frequently
is a luxury that mainly wealthier households can afford. Clothing and shoes as a share of
total consumption rises in total consumption within each age group. Fuel oil and coal as a
share of total consumption falls in total consumption for households aged 46–55, but this
relation does not hold for other age groups. Gasoline as a share of total consumption falls
in total consumption within each age group. Other nondurable goods as a share of total
consumption falls in total consumption within each age group.
Table 2 reports our results for services. Housing as a share of total consumption rises in
total consumption within each age group. Household operation as a share of total consump-
tion falls in total consumption within each age group. Transportation as a share of total
consumption rises in total consumption within each age group. Personal care as a share of
total consumption rises in total consumption for households aged 46–55, but this relation
does not hold for other age groups. Personal business (e.g., accounting, banking, and tax
services) as a share of total consumption rises in total consumption within each age group.
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Recreation as a share of total consumption rises in total consumption within each age group.
Tables 1 and 2 map out the household Engel curves, that is, the variation in expenditure
shares as a function of total consumption. We define basic goods as those categories of
nondurable goods and services for which the expenditure share falls in total consumption
for all age groups. Luxury goods are those categories of nondurable goods and services for
which the expenditure share rises in total consumption for all age groups. Fuel oil and coal
and personal care, for which the expenditure share can rise or fall depending on the age
group, are excluded from our analysis. Based on these definitions, we construct basic and
luxury consumption as the sum of the appropriate categories of expenditure as summarized
in Table 3.
2. Evidence on Household Portfolio Choice
2.1 Survey of Consumer Finances
Data on wealth and portfolio choice are from the repeated cross-section of U.S. households in
the Survey of Consumer Finances for the period 1989–2004. Like the Consumer Expenditure
Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finances is a nationally representative sample of households.
We focus on the sub-sample of stockholders in all of our analysis. Appendix B contains details
on our use of the data, including the definitions of net worth, financial assets, risky assets,
and public equity.
2.2 Portfolio share by age and wealth
We estimate a censored regression model to characterize the relation between the portfolio
share and wealth for stockholders. The outcome variable is the portfolio share, defined as
the share of net worth invested in risky assets. The latent variable depends on age group,
log net worth, log net worth interacted with age group, marital status, household size, and
interview-year dummies. The omitted category is households with four members, whose
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head is aged 46–55 and married.
In our main specification reported in Table 4, the coefficient on log net worth is 3.56,
which shows the portfolio share rises in net worth for households aged 46–55. The magnitude
of the coefficient means that, for an average household aged 46–55, a 100% rise in net worth
is associated with a 3.56 percentage point rise in the portfolio share. The coefficient on the
interaction between log net worth and age group is −1.72 for households aged 36–45, which
implies a 3.56 − 1.72 = 1.84 percentage point change in the expenditure share for a 100%
rise in net worth. The coefficient on the interaction between log net worth and age group is
0.32 for households aged 56–65. In other words, the positive relation between the portfolio
share and net worth is weaker for younger households and stronger for older households.
As emphasized by Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), the fact that age, time, and cohort effects
are not separately identified complicates the interpretation of household portfolio behavior.
A common practice in the literature is to interpret the age profile in household portfolios by
assuming that there is no cohort effect (e.g., Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002; Campbell,
2006). In our main specification, we follow this practice and analyze the relation between the
portfolio share and wealth, controlling for age and interview year. In a second specification
reported in Table 4, however, we include cohort dummies instead of interview-year dummies
to examine the robustness of our findings. The relation between the portfolio share and net
worth is entirely robust to controlling for birth cohort.
Our primary measure of the portfolio share is the share of net worth invested in risky
assets. A narrower measure of the portfolio share, sometimes used in the literature, is the
share of financial wealth invested in public equity. We focus on the broader measure for a
closer correspondence to the portfolio share that enters the intertemporal budget constraint
of the life-cycle model. In a third specification reported in Table 4, however, we use the
narrower measure of the portfolio share as our outcome variable to examine the robustness
of our findings. We still find a statistically significant relation between the portfolio share
and net worth. For an average household aged 46–55, a 100% rise in net worth is associated
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with a 1.58% rise in the portfolio share.
2.3 Portfolio share by education
More educated households tend to be wealthier, and more educated investors tend to have
a higher share of their wealth invested stocks (Campbell, 2006). Therefore, the relation
between net worth and the portfolio share may be explained, at least partly, by education.
To address this issue, Table 5 repeats the analysis in Table 4 separately by education group.
The four education groups are households whose head is not a high school graduate, whose
head is a high school graduate, whose head has some college education, and whose head is
a college graduate. Even after controlling for eduction, there is a strong positive relation
between the portfolio share and net worth, comparable to that reported in Table 4.
3. A Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Portfolio
Choice
3.1 Nonhomothetic utility
Suppose the household consumes two types of nondurable goods, denoted by B and L (for
reasons that will become apparent in what follows). We assume that the household’s in-
tratemporal utility is given by the additive logarithmic (addilog) function,
V (B,L) =
(
B1−λ +
α(1− λ)
1− φ L
1−φ
)1/(1−λ)
, (1)
where α ≥ 0 is the utility weight on L (Houthakker, 1960). The curvature parameters satisfy
the restriction λ ≥ φ > 1. Although there are many goods and services in practice, the two-
good addilog model is a tractable simplification that captures the key features of the data
for our application.
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We embed the addilog function in the household’s intertemporal utility as
U(B,L) =
V (B,L)1−γ
1− γ , (2)
where γ > 1. This specification is a tractable parametric model that permits both nonhomo-
theticity and non-separability across goods. Since Houthakker (1960), this utility function
has been applied in a number of settings to model the fact that as households grow wealthier,
they spend relatively more on some goods than on others (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980;
Ogaki, 1992; Bils and Klenow, 1998; Äıt-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo, 2004; Pakoš, 2004).
The household’s consumption allocations are determined entirely by the properties of
intratemporal utility. Let Q denote the relative price of L in units of B. Optimal relative
consumption of the two goods is determined by the first-order condition
VL
VB
=
αL−φ
B−λ
= Q. (3)
The elasticity of substitution between the two goods is
d log(B/(QL))
d logQ
=
1/B + 1/(QL)
λ/B + φ/(QL)
. (4)
Let C = B + QL denote total consumption. The first-order condition (4) implies the
expenditure shares
B
C
=
1
1 + α1/φQ1−1/φBλ/φ−1
, (5)
QL
C
=
1
1 + α−1/λQ1/λ−1Lφ/λ−1
. (6)
The level of expenditure for both B and L rises in total consumption. However, the ex-
penditure share for B falls, and the expenditure share for L rises in total consumption. We
therefore refer to B as the “basic good” and L as the “luxury good”.
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By substituting the expenditure shares (5) and (6) into utility function (2), we can express
household utility as a function of total consumption and the relative price of the luxury good.
We denote the so-called indirect utility function as
V̂ (C,Q) = max
B+QL=C
V (B,L), (7)
Û(C,Q) =
V̂ (C,Q)1−γ
1− γ . (8)
3.1.1 Decreasing relative risk aversion
An important implication of nonhomothetic utility is decreasing relative risk aversion (Stiglitz,
1969). By Hanoch (1977, Theorem 1), we can calculate the household’s relative risk aversion
as
RRA =− (BUB + LUL)(UBBULL − U
2
BL)
U2BULL − 2UBULUBL + U2LUBB
=
(
1
λ
B
C
+
1
φ
QL
C
)−1(
B +
1− λ
1− φQL
)−1(
γ
λ
B +
ξ(1− λ)
φ(1− φ)QL
)
, (9)
where
ξ =
γ(1− φ) + φ− λ
1− λ < γ. (10)
When the household is poor, it consumes mostly basic goods, and its relative risk aversion
is close to γ. As the household becomes wealthier, it consumes more luxury goods, and its
relative risk aversion falls toward ξ.
3.1.2 Homothetic utility as a special case
When λ = φ, nonhomothetic utility (1) collapses to the homothetic utility function,
V (B,L) = (B1−λ + αL1−λ)1/(1−λ). (11)
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This specification is also referred to as constant elasticity of substitution utility because the
elasticity of substitution between the two goods is constant at 1/λ. The household’s indirect
utility is
V̂ (C,Q) = C(1 + α1/λQ1−1/λ)1/(1/λ−1). (12)
This expression for the indirect utility function shows that the assumption of homotheticity
leads to power utility over a composite consumption good, which is the benchmark model
in the life-cycle literature. Homothetic utility implies constant relative risk aversion. We
calibrate and solve the homothetic life-cycle model to highlight the distinct implications of
the nonhomothetic life-cycle model.
3.2 Life-cycle problem
We solve a life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice problem for a household with non-
homothetic utility (2). The household enters each period t ∈ [1, T ] with cash-on-hand Wt,
which consists of financial assets and labor income Yt. The household’s total consumption is
Ct = Bt + QtLt, which is optimally allocated between basic goods Bt and luxury goods Lt.
Wealth remaining after consumption, St = Wt−Bt−QtLt, is saved either in bonds or stocks.
Bonds have a constant gross rate of return Rf , and stocks have a stochastic gross rate of
return Re,t. The household is subject to a borrowing constraint, so that St ≥ 0. Following
a common assumption in the life-cycle literature, the household is subject to a short-sales
constraint, so that the portfolio share must satisfy at ∈ [0, 1].
The household dies with certainty in period T + 1, leaving behind cash-on-hand WT+1.
The household has bequest utility over terminal wealth, bÛ (WT+1, QT+1), where the parame-
ter b > 0 determines the strength of the bequest motive. We specify the bequest utility to be
the same functional form as the household’s indirect utility (8), so that the curvature of the
utility function is continuous from period T to T + 1. Therefore, our mechanism is distinct
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from that of Carroll (2002), in which wealth left as a bequest is a luxury good relative to
consumption during lifetime.
Let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the household’s subjective discount factor. The household’s problem
is to choose consumption and the portfolio share in each period to maximize the expected
discounted sum of future utility flow,
E1
[
T∑
t=1
βt−1U(Bt, Lt) + βT bÛ(WT+1, QT+1)
]
. (13)
The household is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint,
Wt+1 =Rt+1(Wt −Bt −QtLt) + Yt+1, (14)
Rt+1 =Rf + at(Re,t+1 − Rf), (15)
in each period t ∈ [1, T ].
3.3 Calibration of the model
Following Carroll (1997), we calibrate the model to a 50-year life cycle. The household
works and earns labor income from age 26 through 65 (i.e., t ∈ [1, 40]). The household is
retired and earns retirement income from age 66 through 76 (i.e., t ∈ [41, 51]). At age 76,
the household dies and leaves the remaining wealth as a bequest. Table 6 summarizes the
parameters in the benchmark calibration, which we now discuss in more detail.
3.3.1 Preferences
For the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, we calibrate the parameters in intratemporal utility
(1) to match the basic expenditure share in the Consumer Expenditure Survey. We set
α = 2.9 to match the level of the basic expenditure share for the median household across
all age groups. For example, the basic expenditure share is 47% for households aged 46–55.
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From equation (4), λ = 2.0 and φ = 1.1 determine the elasticity of substitution between
the two goods. These parameter values are chosen to match the variation in the basic
expenditure share in each age group. For example, the basic expenditure share varies from
57% for the lowest consumption quartile to 35% for the highest quartile for households aged
46–55.
We specify the relative price of the luxury good as
Qt = Qt−1eqt, (16)
where we normalize Q1 = 1. We calibrate the growth rate of the relative price as
qt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−14% for t ∈ [2, 11]
−12% for t ∈ [12, 21]
−10% for t ∈ [22, 31]
−8% for t ∈ [32, 41]
0% for t ∈ [42, 51]
. (17)
The basic expenditure share rises as the relative price of the luxury good falls because the
income effect dominates the substitution effect (see equations (5) and (6)). This specification
allows us to match the stable profile of the basic expenditure share over the life cycle, from
47% for households aged 26–35 to 51% for households aged 66–75. Our model, in which α is
constant and Q varies over the life cycle, is isomorphic to one in which Q is constant and α
varies over the life cycle. In other words, life-cycle variation in α and Q are not separately
identified. Consequently, we treat the relative price of the luxury good as a preference
parameter for the purposes of calibration. It can be viewed as a reduced-form way to capture
life-cycle effects in preferences, like changes in family composition or employment status over
the life cycle.
We set the subjective discount factor to β = 0.96, which is a common choice in the life-
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cycle literature. As shown in equation (9), the relative risk aversion depends on γ, together
with the other preference parameters. We choose the level of risk aversion to match the
level of stockholding in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Specifically, given the choices
for the other preference parameters described above, γ = 45 matches the portfolio share for
the median household aged 46–55, which is 30%. While our choice comes close to matching
the portfolio shares for older households aged 46–75, higher values of γ are necessary to
explain the low portfolio shares for younger households. Finally, we calibrate the strength of
the bequest motive to match the wealth-income ratio for the median household aged 66–75,
which is 8.7.
For the homothetic life-cycle model, we also set the discount factor to β = 0.96. We
choose the level of risk aversion, which is γ in this model, to match the level of stockholding
in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Specifically, we set γ = 7 to match the portfolio share
for the median household aged 46–55. Finally, we calibrate the strength of the bequest motive
to match the wealth-income ratio for the median household aged 66–75. For simplicity, we
assume that the relative price of the luxury good is constant in the homothetic life-cycle
model. Even if the relative price were to vary over the life cycle, homotheticity necessarily
implies a basic expenditure share that is constant in wealth.
3.3.2 Labor income
Following Zeldes (1989) and Carroll (1997), we model the household’s stochastic labor income
as
Yt =Ptεt, (18)
Pt =GtPt−1ηt, (19)
given an initial level P1. The variable Pt denotes “permanent income” in period t, defined
as the labor income that would be earned in the absence of transitory shocks (i.e., εt = 1).
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Permanent income has a deterministic component that grows at the rate Gt in each period,
which we estimate using the Consumer Expenditure Survey as explained in Appendix A.
During the household’s working life (through age 65), permanent income is subject to an
independently and identically distributed shock
log ηt ∼ N
(
−σ
2
η
2
, σ2η
)
, (20)
where N denotes the normal distribution. The permanent shock has mean E[ηt] = 1.
Labor income is also subject to an independently and identically distributed transitory
shock
εt =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 0 with probability pε̃t with probability 1− p , (21)
log ε̃t ∼N(με, σ2ε ). (22)
Unemployment occurs with probability p. The parameter με is chosen so that the transitory
shock has mean E[εt] = 1. In our benchmark case, we set the probability of unemployment to
zero so that με = −σ2ε /2 (as in the benchmark calibrations of Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout,
2005; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005). Following the methodology of Carroll and Samwick
(1997), we estimate the variance of the income shocks for the sub-sample of stockholders in
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Based on the estimates, we calibrate the model so
that σ2η = 1.92% and σ
2
ε = 3.67%.
During retirement, we assume that labor income is subject to the same transitory shocks
as during working life, but is not subject to the permanent shocks. The transitory shocks
are meant to capture idiosyncratic risk in retirement, such as medical expenses (Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995). In practice, the transitory shocks make little difference to the
results except to make the level of wealth accumulation in retirement higher, which is more
consistent with that observed in the Survey of Consumer Finances.
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3.3.3 Asset returns
We calibrate asset returns using a common specification in the life-cycle portfolio-choice
literature (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005). We set the bond return to 2% per year and the
equity premium to 4% per year. Stock returns are distributed as
Re,t =Reνt, (23)
log νt ∼N
(
−σ
2
ν
2
, σ2ν
)
. (24)
The shock to stock returns has mean E[νt] = 1 and standard deviation σν = 18%. We
set the correlation between the shocks to stock returns and permanent income to ρ =
E[(log νt)(log ηt)]/(σνση) = 0.15 (as estimated by Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout,
2001; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005).
3.4 Discussion of the model
In our benchmark model, it is always optimal for the household to own some stocks, regardless
of the level of wealth. In reality, however, a significant share of the population does not
own stocks (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). There are various
proposed explanations for non-participation, including fixed costs of participation (Cocco,
2005; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Hu, 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005) and investor mistakes
(Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2007). Because non-participation is outside the scope of our
study, we interpret our model as a description of stockholders (i.e., those that have already
paid the fixed cost and are making optimal decisions). In comparing the model to the data,
we focus on the sub-sample of stockholders in the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the
Survey of Consumer Finances.
In modeling household consumption and portfolio choice, we have made several simpli-
fying assumptions. The assumptions allow us to focus on the portfolio implications of the
nonhomothetic life-cycle model in the simplest setting. We now discuss two of these assump-
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tions briefly and provide some intuition for how modifications of these assumptions are likely
to affect our results.
The first assumption is that households have identical labor income processes. Educa-
tion is perhaps the most obvious dimension along which there may be income heterogeneity.
Carroll and Samwick (1997, Table 1) report the variance of permanent income shocks by
education: 2.1% for some high school, 2.8% for high school graduates, 2.4% for some college,
1.5% for college graduates, and 1.2% for graduate school. Insofar as education proxies for
permanent income, the variance of permanent income shocks appears to fall in the level
of permanent income. This empirical evidence favors the nonhomothetic life-cycle model
because the homothetic alternative, given these income volatilities, would predict that the
volatility of consumption falls in wealth, which seems inconsistent with the empirical evi-
dence (Parker, 2001; Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy, 2002; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). In a
previous version of this paper, we have calibrated the model separately by education group
to verify that income heterogeneity is not critical for our results.
The second assumption is that expected stock returns are constant. A time-varying
investment opportunity set can generate life-cycle patterns in stock ownership, but it is
unlikely to affect the relation between the portfolio share and wealth that is the focus of
this paper. For this line of work, we refer to Kim and Omberg (1996), Balduzzi and Lynch
(1999), Campbell and Viceira (1999), Barberis (2000), and Wachter (2002).
4. Solution of the Life-Cycle Model
We solve the life-cycle problem through numerical dynamic programming as described in
Appendix C. As shown in the appendix, the household’s value function can be written as
a function of age (t), normalized cash-on-hand (wt = Wt/Pt), and permanent income (Pt).
This section describes the optimal policies for consumption and portfolio choice.
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4.1 Optimal consumption policy
Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption policy, as a function of normalized cash-on-hand
and permanent income, for the household at age 50. The policy variables are basic consump-
tion and luxury consumption, both of which are expressed in units of basic consumption and
normalized by permanent income. At a fixed level of permanent income, the consumption
function for both basic and luxury goods share the two key features of the consumption func-
tion in the homothetic life-cycle model. First, both functions are monotonically increasing
in cash-on-hand. Second, both functions are concave in cash-on-hand.
At a fixed level of normalized cash-on-hand, basic consumption falls more than pro-
portionally with permanent income, and luxury consumption rises more than proportionally
with permanent income. At a low level of permanent income, basic consumption rises rapidly
in normalized cash-on-hand, while luxury consumption rises only gradually in normalized
cash-on-hand. Put differently, the marginal propensity to consume the basic good is high,
while the marginal propensity to consume the luxury good is low. However, the marginal
propensity to consume the luxury good rises more rapidly in permanent income than does
the marginal propensity to consume the basic good. At a sufficiently high level of permanent
income, the luxury good becomes the more responsive of the two goods to cash-on-hand.
4.2 Optimal portfolio policy
Figure 2 shows the optimal portfolio policy, as a function of normalized cash-on-hand and
permanent income, for the household at age 50. At a fixed level of permanent income, the
portfolio share falls in cash-on-hand. Because labor income is relatively stable and has a low
correlation with stock returns, human capital is nearly a substitute for bonds. The lower is
cash-on-hand relative to permanent income, the higher is the implicit allocation to bonds as
a share of total wealth (i.e., the sum of financial wealth and human capital). Therefore, the
lower is normalized cash-on-hand, the higher is the optimal allocation to stocks as a share
of financial wealth. This effect is also present in the homothetic life-cycle model (Bodie,
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Merton, and Samuelson, 1992).
At a fixed level of normalized cash-on-hand, higher permanent income leads to lower risk
aversion under nonhomothetic utility. Consequently, the household allocates a higher share
of wealth to stocks at a higher level of permanent income. At a low level of permanent
income, the household allocates a high share of total consumption to the basic good, and it
resembles a power-utility investor with high risk aversion γ. At a high level of permanent
income, the household allocates a high share of total consumption to the luxury good, and
it resembles a power-utility investor with low risk aversion ξ.
In summary, the model predicts that there are two offsetting effects of wealth on portfolio
choice, one that operates through cash-on-hand and another that operates through perma-
nent income. In the next section, we simulate the model to understand the interaction of
these two effects.
5. Simulation of the Life-Cycle Model
In order to assess the quantitative implications of the model, we simulate a cross-section of
10,000 households at an annual frequency. The households are ex ante identical, have non-
homothetic utility, and face non-tradable labor income. Table 6 summarizes the preference
and income parameters of the model. In order to highlight the novel implications of the
nonhomothetic life-cycle model, we repeat the same simulation exercise for the homothetic
life-cycle model.
For each household, we draw an initial level of wealth (relative to permanent income)
from a lognormal distribution. Based on estimates for the sub-sample of stockholders in
the Survey of Consumer Finances, we set the mean of W1/P1 to 0.988 and the standard
deviation of its logarithm to 1.370. Similarly, we draw an initial level of permanent income
from a lognormal distribution. Based on estimates for the sub-sample of stockholders in the
Consumer Expenditure Survey, we normalize the mean of P1 to one and set the standard
20
deviation of its logarithm to 0.512.
5.1 Implications for consumption
Panel A of Table 7 reports the basic expenditure share for stockholders in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, tabulated by age group and consumption quartile. To create the table,
we first sort households into age groups of ten years, based on the age of the household head.
Within each age group and interview year, we then sort households into quartiles based on
their total consumption.3 For each age group, we create an additional bin for households
whose consumption is in the top fifth percentile, in order to separately analyze the behavior
of the wealthy. The last row of the panel reports statistics for all households in that age
group.
For households aged 36–45, basic consumption is 59% of total consumption for the lowest
consumption quartile and 38% for the highest quartile. The basic expenditure share is 30%
for households in the top fifth percentile of total consumption. For households aged 56–65,
basic consumption is 60% of total consumption for the lowest consumption quartile and 34%
for the highest quartile. The basic expenditure share is 28% for households in the top fifth
percentile of total consumption. The small standard errors indicate that there is virtually
no sampling uncertainty around these point estimates.
In Panel B, we sort households simulated in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model into age
groups, then into quartiles of consumption within each age group. We then tabulate the
median of the basic expenditure share within each bin and compare the results with the
empirical moments in Panel A. Within each age group, the basic expenditure share falls in
total consumption, essentially matching the empirical moments. For households aged 36–45,
basic consumption is 58% of total consumption for the lowest consumption quartile and 35%
3In comparing the level of consumption across households, we control for household characteristics, using
a procedure similar to that in Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). We regress
log consumption on a set of dummy variables for marital status and household size. For each household, we
use the estimated coefficients to compute the equivalence scale for a household with four members, whose
head is married.
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for the highest quartile. The basic expenditure share is 30% for households in the top fifth
percentile of total consumption. For households aged 56–65, basic consumption is 62% of
total consumption for the lowest consumption quartile and 36% for the highest quartile. The
basic expenditure share is 31% for households in the top fifth percentile of total consumption.
These results can be explained by the shape of the consumption policy functions in
Figure 1. As households become wealthier, their consumption of the luxury good (i.e., the
good with the lower curvature) rises relative to their consumption of the basic good (i.e., the
good with the higher curvature). Therefore, the basic expenditure share falls in wealth in
the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, in contrast to the homothetic life-cycle model in which
the expenditure share is constant.
5.2 Implications for portfolio choice
We now examine the implications of our model for portfolio choice. Specifically, we examine
the portfolio share by wealth, the portfolio share by age, and the response of the portfolio
share to changes in wealth.
5.2.1 Portfolio share by wealth
Panel A of Table 8 reports the median portfolio share for stockholders in the Survey of
Consumer Finances, tabulated by age group and wealth quartile. For households aged 36–
45, the portfolio share is 23% for the lowest wealth quartile and 44% for the highest quartile.
The portfolio share is 67% for households in the top fifth percentile of net worth. For
households aged 56–65, the portfolio share is 18% for the lowest wealth quartile and 47% for
the highest quartile. The portfolio share is 65% for households in the top fifth percentile of
net worth. The small standard errors indicate that there is virtually no sampling uncertainty
around these point estimates.
Panel B reports the portfolio share for households simulated in the nonhomothetic life-
cycle model. The portfolio share rises in wealth for all but the youngest households, broadly
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consistent with the empirical evidence in Panel A. For households aged 36–45, the portfolio
share is 29% for the lowest wealth quartile and 42% for the highest quartile. The portfolio
share is 44% for households in the top fifth percentile of wealth. For households aged 56–65,
the portfolio share is 17% for the lowest wealth quartile and 34% for the highest quartile.
The portfolio share is 36% for households in the top fifth percentile of wealth.
As discussed in Section 4, there are two offsetting effects that determine the relation
between the portfolio share and wealth in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model. On the one
hand, households with higher wealth have higher normalized cash-on-hand (i.e., the ratio of
cash-on-hand to permanent income), holding constant the level of permanent income. On
the other hand, higher wealth implies higher permanent income, holding constant the level
of normalized cash-on-hand. With the exception of the youngest households, the latter effect
dominates so that overall there is a positive relation between the portfolio share and wealth.
As households age and accumulate permanent income shocks, the cross-sectional variation
in permanent income rises. This effect explains why the difference in the portfolio share
between high and low wealth households becomes more pronounced from youth to middle
age.
Panel C reports the portfolio share for households simulated in the homothetic life-
cycle model, which provides a useful contrast to the nonhomothetic life-cycle model. For
households aged 36–45, the portfolio share falls in wealth from 47% for the lowest wealth
quartile to 40% for the highest quartile. For households aged 46–55, the portfolio share is
flat in wealth. For households aged 56–65, the portfolio share rises slightly in wealth from
26% for the lowest wealth quartile to 28% for the highest quartile.
In the homothetic life-cycle model, normalized cash-on-hand is the single state variable
that determines portfolio choice. As discussed in Section 4, the portfolio share falls in
normalized cash-on-hand. Recall that cash-on-hand is wealth plus current labor income.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the portfolio share falls in wealth for younger households
aged 26–45. What is perhaps more surprising is that the portfolio share is flat or rising for
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older households. This is driven by the fact that as households accumulate more wealth,
cash-on-hand and permanent income become positively related. Therefore, households with
higher cash-on-hand may in fact have lower normalized cash-on-hand, and therefore a higher
portfolio share. Shim (2009) also describes this effect and emphasizes its dependence on the
persistence of labor income shocks. While this effect can produce a pattern for the portfolio
share that is qualitatively consistent with the data, the magnitude of the effect is small.
This effect is also present in the nonhomothetic model and may contribute to the positive
relation between portfolio share and wealth for older households. In the nonhomothetic
model, however, this effect is greatly enhanced by the direct effect of permanent income on
portfolio choice.
5.2.2 Portfolio share by age
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, the portfolio share in the Survey of Consumer Finances
has a slight hump-shaped age profile (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). An implication of the
homothetic life-cycle model is that the portfolio share falls in age, which is inconsistent with
the empirical evidence (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). Households are born with little
wealth, but a large stake in non-tradable human capital. Because stocks have a high average
rate of return and low correlation with labor income, optimal portfolio allocation requires
that households initially allocate most of their wealth to stocks. As households age, they
accumulate wealth and decumulate their human capital. The portfolio share consequently
falls because there is less need to diversify human capital.
In the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, this age effect in portfolio choice is offset by the
fact that households become less risk averse as their permanent income grows over the life
cycle. Panel B shows that the median portfolio share gradually falls in the nonhomothetic
life-cycle model, from 63% for households aged 26–35 to 25% for households aged 56–65. We
find that decreasing relative risk aversion alone cannot fully explain the high portfolio share
for the youngest households. In contrast, Panel C shows that the median portfolio share
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falls more strongly in the homothetic life-cycle model, from 90% for households aged 26–35
to 27% for households aged 56–65.
The literature has proposed other compelling explanations for the discrepancy between
the life-cycle implications of the homothetic life-cycle model and the data. First, the true
relation between age and the portfolio share is unknown because of the lack of identification
between age, time, and cohort effects (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). Second, the purchase of
housing and small fixed costs can crowd out stocks from the household’s portfolio early in life
(Cocco, 2005; Hu, 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005). Third, internal habit formation can induce a
strong motive to save in bonds early in life, crowding out stocks from the household’s portfolio
(Gomes and Michaelides, 2003; Polkovnichenko, 2007). Finally, different assumptions about
the joint process for stock returns and labor income can substantially reduce stockholding
for younger households (Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2007; Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron, 2007; Lynch and Tan, 2010).
5.2.3 Response of the portfolio share to changes in wealth
In recent work, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) use data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics and find that the portfolio share falls slightly (or changes very little) in response to
an increase in wealth. Their findings may initially appear to be evidence against decreasing
relative risk aversion, and therefore, evidence against the nonhomothetic life-cycle model. In
this section, we show that their findings are entirely consistent with our model.
Using data simulated in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, we estimate a cross-sectional
regression model. We obtain the estimates
100(at − at−1) = −0.9 − 7.5 log
(
St
St−1
)
+ et, (25)
where at is the portfolio share and St is wealth in period t. (The portfolio share has been
multiplied by 100 in the regression so that its units are percentage points.) The coefficient
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on the change in wealth is −7.5, which implies that a 10% increase in wealth leads to a 0.75
percentage point fall in the portfolio share. The regression model reported here is estimated
on a pooled sample of households across all age groups, but we obtain similar results when
we estimate the model separately by age. Importantly, the coefficient produced by our model
is the same sign and order of magnitude as that reported in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008,
Table 4).
In the absence of labor income, Brunnermeier and Nagel hypothesize that models with
decreasing relative risk aversion imply that the portfolio share should rise in response to
an increase in wealth. In the presence of labor income, however, models with decreasing
relative risk aversion imply that the portfolio share can fall in response to an increase in
wealth. This is evident in Figure 2, which shows that the optimal portfolio share falls in
normalized cash-on-hand and rises in permanent income. To clarify this point, we now add
consumption growth to the cross-sectional regression model. We obtain the estimates
100(at − at−1) = −0.8− 12.6 log
(
St
St−1
)
+ 10.6 log
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
+ et, (26)
where Ct is consumption in period t. The coefficients of the regression show that the portfolio
share falls in response to a positive wealth shock, holding constant consumption growth which
proxies for the change in permanent income.
Our findings here have practical implications for empirical work. Cross-sectional regres-
sions, such as equation (25), are not useful for detecting the presence of decreasing relative
risk aversion. In the life-cycle model, the portfolio share rises only in response to permanent
wealth shocks, not in response to transitory shocks. One way to isolate permanent changes
in wealth is to include consumption growth in the regression, as in equation (26). In prac-
tice, however, this is difficult because data sets with consumption, such as the Consumer
Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, have poor or incomplete data
on wealth. Conversely, data sets with wealth, such as the Survey of Consumer Finances,
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have no consumption data.
5.3 Portfolio choice with unemployment risk
We now examine how unemployment risk, modeled as a positive probability of zero income,
affects portfolio choice. The possibility of zero income can cause the optimal portfolio share
to rise in cash-on-hand at a sufficiently low level of wealth, even under power utility (Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). The parameters of the model remain the same as those
in Table 6, except that labor income can be zero in any period of the working life with
probability 0.5% (Carroll, 1992). This scenario is potentially extreme because an unemployed
household may have other sources of income such as unemployment benefits and social
welfare (Gakidis, 1998). This scenario should therefore be interpreted as a robustness check
that leads to maximum contrast to our benchmark case with no unemployment.
Because the results for consumption are nearly identical to those in the benchmark case
with no unemployment, we focus on the results for portfolio choice in this section. Panel A
of Table 8 reports the median portfolio share for stockholders in the Survey of Consumer
Finances for the purposes of comparison to the models. Panel B reports the portfolio share in
the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, and Panel C reports the portfolio share in the homothetic
life-cycle model. Unemployment risk lowers the portfolio share for the youngest households,
especially for those in the lowest wealth quartile. However, unemployment risk hardly affects
older households who have accumulated enough wealth to buffer these transitory shocks to
labor income.
Given the preference and income parameters that have realistic implications for household
saving behavior, unemployment risk does not have a significant effect on portfolio choice for
most households. Distributional assumptions that lead to more dependence between stock
returns and labor income can have a similar effect to unemployment risk, that is, the portfolio
share can rise in cash-on-hand at a sufficiently low level of wealth (Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne,
and Goldstein, 2007; Lynch and Tan, 2010). However, this effect disappears in age and should
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be nonexistent for retired households with no labor income. Therefore, it cannot explain the
fact that the relation between the portfolio share and wealth persists as households age.
5.4 Implications for asset pricing
Although the focus of this paper is portfolio choice, our model has important implications
for asset pricing that are also consistent with the empirical evidence. A recent and growing
literature in asset pricing proposes heterogeneity in risk aversion as an explanation for a
number of facts that are puzzling from the point of view of the benchmark model (i.e.,
representative household with constant relative risk aversion).
One branch of the literature is motivated by the observation that the consumption Euler
equation need not hold for a representative household because only a sub-sample of the popu-
lation actually own stock (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991). Moreover, markets may be incomplete
or risk aversion may be heterogeneous within the sub-sample of stockholders. Parker (2001)
and Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) estimate the Euler equation with excess stock
returns, separately for stockholders in the Consumer Expenditure Survey at different lev-
els of wealth. They find some evidence that the level of risk aversion necessary to account
for the joint time-series behavior of consumption and stock returns is lower for wealthier
households. This finding is based on the fact that both the variance of consumption growth
and the covariance of consumption growth with stock returns rises in wealth within the sub-
sample of stockholders.4 Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) and Malloy, Moskowitz,
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) show a similar result for excess returns on value stocks over
growth stocks as well as small-cap stocks over large-cap stocks.
Another branch of the literature analyzes general equilibrium economies in which house-
holds have heterogeneous risk aversion. Chan and Kogan (2002) and Gârleanu and Panageas
(2008) show that heterogeneity in risk aversion leads to countercyclical variation in the price
4At the extreme upper tail of the wealth distribution not represented in the Consumer Expenditure
Survey, Aı̈t-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004) find that the consumption of luxury goods, constructed from
data on the sales of luxury retailers, has an even higher covariance with stock returns.
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of risk, through endogenous changes in the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. These
models offer quantitative explanations for important asset-pricing facts such as the high eq-
uity premium, the volatility of stock returns, and the countercyclical variation in the equity
premium.
The asset-pricing literature discussed above takes heterogeneity in risk aversion as ex-
ogenous. Our model endogenizes such heterogeneity in an economy of ex ante identical
households with nonhomothetic preferences, subject to idiosyncratic income shocks over the
life cycle. We thus provide a parsimonious explanation for heterogeneity in risk aversion;
wealthier households consume more luxury goods and are therefore more tolerant of uncer-
tainty in their consumption stream. Our model is consistent with those asset-pricing facts
that can be explained by heterogeneity in risk aversion. Moreover, our model is consistent
with the empirical evidence on household consumption and portfolio choice as this paper has
shown.
In addition to cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk aversion, our model also implies that
risk aversion varies over time for individual households. Our model implies that individual
households become more risk averse when their wealth decreases. Consequently, the house-
hold’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is more volatile and has higher negative
covariance with stock returns, compared to the benchmark model with constant relative risk
aversion. This precise mechanism has been exploited in a representative household context
to explain important asset-pricing facts, most notably by Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
In a similar line of work, Pakoš (2004) and Lochstoer (2009) explain the asset-pricing facts
in a two-good model with luxury goods, building on the work of Äıt-Sahalia, Parker, and
Yogo (2004). We suspect that time-varying risk aversion would magnify the effects of het-
erogeneity in risk aversion demonstrated by the studies discussed above, making it easier to
explain the asset-pricing facts.
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6. Conclusion
Household surveys of consumption and wealth have uncovered numerous facts that are incon-
sistent with the life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice model with homothetic utility.
1. The expenditure share for various categories of nondurable goods and services vary
significantly in total consumption.
2. The portfolio share rises in wealth, even after controlling for stock market participation
and education.
3. The portfolio share is relatively stable in age.
4. The portfolio share falls slightly (or changes very little) in response to an increase in
wealth (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008).
In this paper, we propose a simple and parsimonious explanation for the observed cross-
sectional variation in consumption and portfolio behavior. Our only departure from previous
life-cycle models is that the household has nonhomothetic utility over two types of consump-
tion goods. Nonhomothetic utility has a long tradition in microeconomic studies of consumer
behavior, but there has been little application in life-cycle models of consumption and port-
folio choice. We calibrate the model with a widely used labor-income process that has low
correlation with stock returns. We find that the nonhomothetic life-cycle model quantita-
tively explains all four of these facts on household consumption and portfolio choice.
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Appendix A. Consumer Expenditure Survey
The Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data on household characteristics, major expendi-
tures, and income in the Interview Survey component of the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics uses a national probability sample of households, designed
to represent the total noninstitutional civilian population. The survey is a rotating panel
of approximately 5,000 households every calendar quarter (rising to 7,000 households more
recently). The Bureau of Labor Statistics interviews each household up to five times every
three months before replacement. The first interview is for practice, so that only the second
through fifth interviews are available in the public-use data files. The Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics interviews approximately the same number of households in each of the three months of
a calendar quarter, and households report their expenditures from the previous three months
at each interview. Therefore, the survey can be thought of as three non-overlapping panels
of quarterly expenditure data. We use the consumer unit replicate weight (FINLWT21) to
weight households in all of our analysis, although the results are not at all sensitive to the
use of the sample weight.
We use all data files from 1982 through 2003. We do not use data files from 1980 and
1981 because the expenditure on food was collected with a different questionnaire. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics has changed the sampling design of the Consumer Expenditure
Survey on two occasions, between 1985 and 1986 and between 1995 and 1996. Consequently,
households cannot be linked across data files during these years. Therefore, households in
the 1985:4 interview are linked to the same households in the early release of 1986:1 interview
from the 1985 data files. Similarly, we use the early release of 1996:1 interview from the 1995
data files.
Following a common procedure in the literature (Attanasio and Weber, 1995), we drop
households that live in rural areas, live in student housing, or are incomplete income respon-
dents. We drop rural households because the Bureau of Labor Statistics failed to interview
them during 1981:3–1983:4. We use the Member Characteristics and Income File to identify
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the reference person of each household and, for married households, the spouse. We de-
fine the household head as the husband for married households and as the reference person
otherwise. Only households whose head is between age 26 and 75 at the time of interview
are kept for analysis. Households are grouped by birth cohort and education based on the
characteristics of the household head. We create 13 birth cohorts in five-year bins, from
those born 1910–1914 to those born 1975–1979. The four education groups are some high
school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate.
We construct household consumption using the Monthly Expenditures File. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics estimates that approximately 90–95% of total household expenditures are
covered by the survey. We focus on the consumption of nondurable goods and services for
the following major categories of expenditure.
• Nondurable goods: Food at home, food away from home, clothing and shoes, gasoline,
fuel oil and coal, and other nondurable goods.5
• Services: Housing, household operation, transportation, personal care, personal busi-
ness, and recreation.
We exclude durable goods (such as “motor vehicles and parts” and “furniture and household
equipment”), health, and education from our measure of consumption. Because the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey reports only expenditures, the service flow from durable goods
cannot be reliably measured based on the data available. For housing, however, we can
impute its service flow and therefore include it in our measure of consumption. Housing
consumption is the rent paid plus the cost of materials and services for maintenance. For
households that own their home, the Consumer Expenditure Survey reports “the rental
equivalence of owned home”, which we use as our measure of rent.
Our unit of analysis is annual consumption so that each household accounts for one
observation in the data set. To eliminate obvious data errors, we drop households that report
5Other nondurable goods includes semidurable house furnishings, cleaning and polishing preparations,
and nondurable toys and sport supplies.
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no food or only food expenditures in a given month. Monthly expenditures are summed over
all three months of an interview period, which yields total household consumption for that
quarter. We deflate nominal expenditures to real 2001 dollars using the consumer price
index for all urban consumers. Each expenditure item in the Consumer Expenditure Survey
is carefully matched to a region- and item-specific consumer price index, so that the price
deflator is household specific.
In the second and fifth interviews, the Bureau of Labor Statistics collects income data for
the previous twelve months. We compute disposable income as total household income after
taxes minus capital income and pension contributions. Capital income includes interest
on savings accounts and bonds as well as income from dividends, royalties, estates, and
trusts. Pension contributions is the sum of income contributed to Social Security, railroad
retirement, government retirement, private pension, and individual retirement plans.
Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002), we estimate average life-cycle income to cali-
brate the deterministic growth rate of permanent income. We regress log disposable income
on a third degree polynomial in age, which is interacted with a dummy variable for whether
or not the household is retired. The regression also includes dummy variables for marital
status, household size, and birth cohort. We use the estimated coefficients to build the
life-cycle income profile for a “typical” household that works from age 26 through 65 and
is retired from age 66 through 75. At retirement, labor income is estimated to fall by 31%
relative to the previous period. We calibrate the model using the estimated growth rate for
a household with four members, whose head is born in the 1945–1949 cohort and married.
In the fifth interview, the Bureau of Labor Statistics collects financial data for the pre-
vious twelve months. In particular, households report the estimated value of securities such
as stocks, mutual funds, private bonds, and Treasury notes. Following Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002), a household is identified as a stockholder if its holding in these securities was posi-
tive twelve months prior to the interview or has increased in the previous twelve months.
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Appendix B. Survey of Consumer Finances
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducts the Survey of Consumer
Finances every three years based on a dual-frame sample design. They select one sample
based on a standard multistage area-probability design, which leads to a representative
sample of approximately 3,000 households. They select a second sample based on tax data
from the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service, which leads to a
representative sample of approximately 1,500 high-wealth households. The survey provides
sample weights for adjusting biases caused by missing responses and for calculating aggregate
statistics that are representative of the whole population. We use the sample replicate weight
(WGT) to weight households in all of our analysis. Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003)
and references therein describe the sampling methodology in further detail.
Because the data are available in the present format since 1989, we use all data files from
1989 through 2004. Most of our variables are from the extract file of the full public data
set, available in Excel format from the Board of Governors’s Survey of Consumer Finances
website. For the construction of the value of risky bonds, however, we use variables from the
full public data set. Only households whose head is between age 26 and 75 at the time of
interview are kept for analysis. We exclude households with non-positive net worth as well
as those with no risky-asset holdings from the sample. We deflate nominal wealth to real
2001 dollars using the September value of the consumer price index for all urban consumers.
We now define various components of wealth that are relevant for our analysis. The
variable names that follow refer to those from the Survey of Consumer Finances codebook.
Net worth (NETWORTH) is the sum of financial and nonfinancial assets minus all debt.
Financial assets include liquid financial accounts; certificates of deposit; directly held bonds
and stocks; mutual funds; retirement (both individual and employer-sponsored thrift-type)
accounts; the cash value of life insurance; and equity interest in trusts, annuities, and man-
aged investment accounts. Nonfinancial assets include the primary residence, investment
real estate, and business equity. Debt includes mortgage and home equity loans for primary
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residence and investment real estate, credit card balances, and other loans.
Risky assets is the sum of public equity (EQUITY), investment real estate (NNRESRE),
business equity (BUS), and risky bonds (following Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002, Ta-
ble 5.7). Public equity includes both directly held stock and stocks held through mutual
funds, retirement accounts, trusts, and other managed investment accounts. Investment real
estate includes residential and nonresidential property that is not primary residence and not
owned through a business. Business equity is net equity in all types of privately owned busi-
nesses, farms or ranches, professional practices, and partnerships. Risky bonds is the sum of
corporate bonds (X7634), foreign bonds (X7633), and mortgage-backed bonds (X3906).
Appendix C. Numerical Solution of the Life-Cycle Model
Following the usual methodology, we solve the model backward from the last period of life.
In order to define the bequest function, we compute the optimal consumption policy for a
given level of cash-on-hand in the last period:
BT+1 =
WT+1
1 + α1/φQ
1−1/φ
T+1 B
λ/φ−1
T+1
, (C1)
LT+1 =
WT+1
1 + α−1/λQ1/λ−1T+1 L
φ/λ−1
T+1
. (C2)
The value function in period T is given by
JT (WT , PT ) = max
BT ,LT ,aT
{U(BT , LT ) + βET [bU(BT+1, LT+1)]}. (C3)
We normalize the consumption policy variables by permanent income as bt = Bt/Pt
and lt = Lt/Pt. Similarly, we normalize cash-on-hand as wt = Wt/Pt and wealth as st =
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wt − bt −Qtlt. Finally, we define the recursive function
jt(wt, Pt) = max
bt,lt,at
{ut(bt, lt) + βEt[(Gt+1ηt+1)1−γjt+1(wt+1, Pt+1)]}, (C4)
where
ut(bt, lt) =
1
1− γ
(
b1−λt +
α(1− λ)
1− φ P
λ−φ
t l
1−φ
t
)(1−γ)/(1−λ)
. (C5)
The value function in period T can be rewritten as
JT (WT , PT ) = P
1−γ
T jT (wT , PT ). (C6)
By induction, the value function in any period t ≤ T is given by
Jt(Wt, Pt) = P
1−γ
t jt(wt, Pt). (C7)
We redefine the life-cycle problem as the solution to Bellman equation (C4) subject to
the intertemporal budget constraint,
wt+1 =
Rt+1st
Gt+1ηt+1
+ εt+1, (C8)
and the law of motion for permanent income (19). The first-order conditions with respect
to basic consumption (bt) and the portfolio share (at), together with the envelope theorem,
imply that
ubt =Et[βRt+1(Gt+1ηt+1)
−γub,t+1], (C9)
0 =Et[βst(Re,t+1 −Rf )(Gt+1ηt+1)−γub,t+1], (C10)
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where
ubt = b
−γ
t
(
1 +
α(1− λ)
1− φ P
λ−φ
t
l1−φt
b1−λt
)(λ−γ)/(1−λ)
. (C11)
The life-cycle problem is essentially solved through recursion on these equations.
We discretize the joint probability distribution for stock returns and income shocks as
{(νi, pν,i)}Ii=1 ={(ν1, pν,1), . . . , (νI , pν,I)},
{(ηj , pη,j)}Jj=1 ={(η1, pη,1), . . . , (ηJ , pη,J)},
{(εk, pε,k)}Kk=1 ={(ε1, pε,1), . . . , (εK , pε,K)}.
We use a multinomial approximation to the normal distribution with I = J = K = 10, so
that each grid point occurs with equal probability. We discretize wealth after consumpion
as
{sl}Ll=1 ={s1, . . . , sL}.
Similarly, we discretize the state variables as
{wm}Mm=1 ={w1, . . . , wM},
{Pn}Nn=1 ={P1, . . . , PN}.
We space the grid points equally on a logarithmic scale with L = M = 40, N = 20,
sL = wM = 40, and PN = 5.
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In each period t, we define the functions
Θt(sl, Pn) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
pν,ipη,jpε,kβ[Rf + at(sl, Pn)(Reνi − Rf)](Gt+1ηj)−γ
× ub,t+1(wt+1(sl, Pn; νi, ηj , εk), Gt+1Pnηj), (C12)
Ωt(sl, Pn) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
pν,ipη,jpε,kβsl(Reνi − Rf)(Gt+1ηj)−γ
× ub,t+1(wt+1(sl, Pn; νi, ηj , εk), Gt+1Pnηj), (C13)
where
ubt(wt, Pt) =bt(wt, Pt)
−γ
(
1 +
α(1− λ)
1− φ P
λ−φ
t
lt(wt, Pt)
1−φ
bt(wt, Pt)1−λ
)(λ−γ)/(1−λ)
, (C14)
lt(wt, Pt) =
α1/φP
λ/φ−1
t bt(wt, Pt)
λ/φ
Q
1/φ
t
, (C15)
wt+1(sl, Pn; νi, ηj , εk) =
[Rf + at(sl, Pn)(Reνi − Rf )]sl
Gt+1ηj
+ εk. (C16)
Starting with the solution in period T , we use the following algorithm to solve the life-
cycle problem recursively for periods t = T − 1, . . . , 1.
1. For each point (sl, Pn) on the grid, find at(sl, Pn) such that Ωt(sl, Pn) = 0. If an interior
solution does not exist,
at(sl, Pn) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 0 if Ωt(sl, Pn) < 01 if Ωt(sl, Pn) > 0 .
2. For each point (sl, Pn) on the grid, find bt(sl, Pn) and lt(sl, Pn) such that ubt(sl, Pn) =
Θt(sl, Pn).
3. Define wl = sl + bt(sl, Pn) +Qtlt(sl, Pn), at(wl, Pn) = at(sl, Pn) (with a slight abuse of
notation), and bt(wl, Pn) = bt(sl, Pn).
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4. For each point (wm, Pn) on the grid, compute at(wm, Pn) by interpolating at(wl, Pn) as
a function of wl and imposing the constraint at(wm, Pn) ∈ [0, 1].
5. For each point (wm, Pn) on the grid, compute bt(wm, Pn) by interpolating bt(wl, Pn) as
a function of wl. Compute lt(wm, Pn) = α
1/φQ
−1/φ
t P
λ/φ−1
n bt(wm, Pn)
λ/φ.
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Table 1: Relation between the expenditure shares for nondurable goods and total consump-
tion
Explanatory variable Food Food Clothing Fuel oil Gasoline Other
at away from and and nondurable
home home shoes coal goods
Age:
26–35 -1.39 0.14 0.05 -0.22 -0.71 -0.16
(-4.81) (0.65) (0.29) (-2.13) (-5.74) (-1.44)
36–45 -0.20 0.29 0.08 -0.15 -0.43 0.11
(-0.85) (1.70) (0.62) (-1.81) (-4.18) (1.21)
56–65 0.80 -0.42 -0.34 0.18 -0.30 0.22
(3.02) (-2.29) (-2.37) (1.90) (-2.62) (2.12)
66–75 1.33 -1.25 -0.67 0.27 -0.89 -0.13
(4.21) (-6.02) (-4.02) (2.35) (-6.92) (-1.09)
Log consumption -8.05 2.45 1.09 -0.20 -2.45 -0.61
(-26.34) (11.16) (6.33) (-1.81) (-18.11) (-5.19)
Log consumption×Age:
26–35 1.74 -0.49 -0.26 0.14 -0.34 0.57
(3.37) (-1.32) (-0.89) (0.69) (-1.51) (2.87)
36–45 0.50 -0.58 -0.18 0.26 -0.03 -0.15
(1.16) (-1.88) (-0.76) (1.63) (-0.16) (-0.92)
56–65 0.28 -0.15 -0.49 0.08 0.44 -0.13
(0.65) (-0.50) (-2.04) (0.53) (2.35) (-0.81)
66–75 0.17 -0.01 -0.25 0.09 0.88 0.28
(0.39) (-0.04) (-1.00) (0.58) (4.58) (1.67)
Not married -1.65 -0.32 -0.13 -0.13 -0.79 -0.09
(-6.42) (-1.73) (-0.86) (-1.42) (-7.14) (-0.94)
Household size:
1 -7.68 3.36 -0.88 -0.21 -1.72 -0.33
(-24.49) (11.35) (-4.54) (-1.63) (-12.10) (-2.44)
2 -4.33 1.90 -0.58 -0.09 -0.59 0.16
(-18.29) (10.55) (-4.33) (-1.07) (-5.56) (1.73)
3 -2.05 0.59 -0.18 0.04 -0.04 0.17
(-8.08) (3.10) (-1.28) (0.39) (-0.36) (1.64)
5 1.38 -0.18 0.04 -0.16 0.07 0.10
(3.82) (-0.70) (0.21) (-1.33) (0.45) (0.72)
6 or more 2.76 -0.34 -0.26 -0.36 0.90 0.15
(5.29) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-2.19) (3.77) (0.78)
Observations 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739
We estimate a censored regression model for the expenditure share for each category of non-
durable goods. The latent variable depends on age group, log total (nondurable and service)
consumption, log total consumption interacted with age group, marital status, household
size, and interview-year dummies (not reported). The omitted category is households with
four members, whose head is aged 46–55 and married. The sample consists of stockholders
in the 1982–2003 CEX. The table reports the marginal effects at the mean of the regressors
with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 2: Relation between the expenditure shares for services and total consumption
Explanatory variable Housing Household Trans- Personal Personal Recreation
operation portation care business
Age:
26–35 2.76 0.96 -0.74 -0.15 -0.54 -0.19
(8.23) (3.18) (-3.18) (-2.88) (-3.24) (-1.39)
36–45 0.38 0.70 -0.92 -0.10 -0.19 0.53
(1.54) (2.89) (-4.91) (-2.28) (-1.33) (4.57)
56–65 0.58 0.57 -1.13 -0.07 0.32 -0.39
(2.12) (2.12) (-5.54) (-1.43) (2.00) (-3.26)
66–75 1.41 1.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.26 -0.28
(4.20) (3.22) (-0.35) (-1.66) (-1.40) (-1.97)
Log consumption 4.55 -5.23 2.73 0.15 1.21 1.30
(14.55) (-16.87) (10.86) (2.60) (6.59) (8.98)
Log consumption×Age:
26–35 -0.49 1.92 -0.41 -0.18 -0.43 -0.87
(-0.92) (3.67) (-0.96) (-1.89) (-1.40) (-3.57)
36–45 -0.27 1.75 -0.58 -0.04 -0.16 0.26
(-0.61) (4.00) (-1.62) (-0.44) (-0.61) (1.25)
56–65 0.51 -0.24 -0.84 -0.27 1.12 -0.22
(1.17) (-0.56) (-2.38) (-3.35) (4.32) (-1.08)
66–75 -0.63 -1.12 0.58 -0.30 0.87 0.04
(-1.42) (-2.53) (1.60) (-3.69) (3.27) (0.20)
Not married 2.33 -0.11 0.49 0.04 -0.35 -0.09
(8.16) (-0.43) (2.26) (0.74) (-2.25) (-0.74)
Household size:
1 7.54 -4.38 1.19 -0.07 0.27 0.22
(15.71) (-12.88) (3.78) (-1.03) (1.22) (1.24)
2 2.87 -3.20 1.34 0.11 0.17 0.13
(10.87) (-13.27) (6.55) (2.50) (1.14) (1.17)
3 1.12 -1.24 0.54 0.07 0.21 -0.13
(3.95) (-4.77) (2.48) (1.44) (1.35) (-1.09)
5 0.26 -1.06 -0.43 -0.11 0.02 -0.05
(0.71) (-3.03) (-1.51) (-1.76) (0.11) (-0.29)
6 or more -0.20 -0.85 -0.63 -0.33 0.11 -0.57
(-0.39) (-1.70) (-1.60) (-3.91) (0.35) (-2.57)
Observations 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739
We estimate a censored regression model for the expenditure share for each category of
services. The latent variable depends on age group, log total (nondurable and service)
consumption, log total consumption interacted with age group, marital status, household
size, and interview-year dummies (not reported). The omitted category is households with
four members, whose head is aged 46–55 and married. The sample consists of stockholders
in the 1982–2003 CEX. The table reports the marginal effects at the mean of the regressors
with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses.48
Table 3: Expenditure shares for basic and luxury goods
Consumption category Age
26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75
Panel A: Basic goods
Food at home 15.8 17.9 16.6 17.0 18.6
Gasoline 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.6 4.7
Other nondurable goods 3.0 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.1
Household operation 15.9 16.0 15.2 15.6 17.7
Panel B: Luxury goods
Food away from home 8.4 8.6 8.3 7.9 6.5
Cothing and shoes 5.8 6.4 5.9 4.8 4.0
Housing 7.7 5.7 6.4 6.6 8.2
Transportation 8.7 8.3 9.7 8.8 8.2
Personal business 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.2 1.7
Recreation 4.7 5.4 5.0 4.3 3.9
Panel C: Neither basic nor luxury good
Fuel oil and coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Personal care 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
We sort the sample of stockholders in the 1982–2003 CEX into age groups (columns). Panel A
reports the median of expenditure shares, as a percentage of total consumption, for basic
goods. Basic goods are those nondurable goods and services for which the expenditure share
falls in total consumption for all age groups. Panel B reports the median of expenditure
shares for luxury goods. Luxury goods are those nondurable goods and services for which
the expenditure share rises in total consumption for all age groups. Panel C reports the
median of expenditure shares for goods that are neither basic nor luxury.
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Table 4: Relation between the portfolio share and net worth for stockholders
Explanatory variable Main Cohort Alternative
specification effects definition of
stockholding
Age:
26–35 -0.40 -4.66 -2.08
(-1.47) (-13.23) (-6.72)
36–45 0.40 -1.99 -0.38
(1.94) (-8.15) (-1.62)
56–65 -2.73 -1.02 -1.46
(-12.85) (-3.75) (-5.81)
66–75 -6.13 -2.73 -4.67
(-26.84) (-6.80) (-16.09)
Log net worth 3.56 3.58 1.58
(35.61) (35.86) (13.74)
Log net worth×Age:
26–35 -3.04 -3.05 -1.23
(-20.63) (-20.71) (-7.29)
36–45 -1.72 -1.74 -1.05
(-12.86) (-13.03) (-6.87)
56–65 0.32 0.25 -0.12
(2.05) (1.59) (-0.66)
66–75 0.76 0.73 0.31
(4.03) (3.86) (1.34)
Not married -0.17 -0.16 0.10
(-0.61) (-0.59) (0.32)
Household size:
1 4.39 4.51 1.35
(12.00) (12.29) (3.31)
2 1.66 1.83 0.11
(7.74) (8.49) (0.46)
3 0.39 0.43 -0.75
(1.70) (1.85) (-2.87)
5 1.03 1.02 0.81
(3.44) (3.43) (2.40)
6 or more 2.46 2.30 -1.79
(5.38) (5.03) (-3.36)
Observations 71,271 71,271 62,157
We estimate a censored regression model for the portfolio share. The latent variable depends
on age group, log net worth, log net worth interacted with age group, marital status, house-
hold size, and interview-year dummies (not reported). The omitted category is households
with four members, whose head is aged 46–55 and married. In a second specification, we
include cohort dummies, instead of interview-year dummies. In a third specification, we
define the portfolio share as the share of financial wealth in stocks, instead of the share of
net worth in risky assets. The sample consists of stockholders in the 1989–2004 Survey of
Consumer Finances. The table reports the marginal effects at the mean of the regressors
with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5: Relation between the portfolio share and net worth for stockholders by education
Explanatory variable No High Some College
high school college graduates
school graduates
Age:
26–35 0.51 -2.83 -1.18 1.00
(0.40) (-5.00) (-1.73) (2.83)
36–45 2.80 -0.64 0.18 1.20
(2.57) (-1.40) (0.34) (4.51)
56–65 -5.65 -3.27 -3.24 -1.32
(-6.07) (-7.15) (-5.76) (-4.55)
66–75 -4.91 -7.31 -6.59 -5.78
(-4.88) (-14.41) (-11.16) (-17.43)
Log net worth 1.80 2.30 3.85 4.59
(3.38) (9.51) (14.42) (34.22)
Log net worth×Age:
26–35 -1.29 -2.33 -4.58 -3.75
(-1.56) (-6.67) (-11.97) (-19.31)
36–45 -2.32 -1.39 -2.98 -1.61
(-3.25) (-4.39) (-8.55) (-8.93)
56–65 -0.03 0.86 -0.46 -0.49
(-0.04) (2.22) (-1.03) (-2.32)
66–75 -0.26 1.99 0.33 0.88
(-0.37) (3.94) (0.67) (3.27)
Not married 2.45 -0.13 -0.92 0.32
(1.69) (-0.23) (-1.54) (0.75)
Household size:
1 1.41 5.00 2.94 4.27
(0.77) (6.17) (3.60) (8.21)
2 4.69 1.48 -0.60 2.04
(4.55) (3.09) (-1.12) (7.26)
3 3.26 0.86 -2.08 0.69
(2.76) (1.76) (-3.67) (2.25)
5 6.99 4.51 -4.47 1.01
(4.17) (6.48) (-6.49) (2.62)
6 or more 11.09 0.48 3.77 2.11
(5.52) (0.49) (2.88) (3.58)
Observations 3,493 13,990 11,093 42,695
We estimate a censored regression model for the portfolio share, separately by education
group. The latent variable depends on age group, log net worth, log net worth interacted with
age group, marital status, household size, and interview-year dummies (not reported). The
omitted category is households with four members, whose head is aged 46–55 and married.
The sample consists of stockholders in the 1989–2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. The
table reports the marginal effects at the mean of the regressors with corresponding t-statistics
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Table 6: Parameters in the benchmark calibration
Parameter Symbol Nonhomothetic Homothetic
Preferences:
Subjective discount factor β 0.96 0.96
Utility weight on the luxury good α 2.9
Inverse of the elasticity of substitution as basic share approaches 0 λ 2.0
Inverse of the elasticity of substitution as basic share approaches 1 φ 1.1
Relative risk aversion as basic share approaches 1 γ 45 7
Strength of the bequest motive b 2× 106 1× 102
Labor income:
Standard deviation of permanent shocks to income ση 13.85% 13.85%
Standard devation of transitory shocks to income σε 19.16% 19.16%
Correlation between permanent shock to income and stock returns ρ 0.15 0.15
Asset returns:
Riskfree rate Rf − 1 2% 2%
Equity premium Re − Rf 4% 4%
Standard deviation of stock returns σν 18% 18%
The table reports parameters used in the benchmark calibration of the life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice model with
stochastic labor income. In the nonhomothetic life-cycle model, the household has nonhomothetic utility over basic and luxury
goods. The the homothetic life-cycle model, the household has power utility over a composite consumption good. In both
models, we calibrate the level of risk aversion to match the portfolio share for the median household aged 46–55. We calibrate
the strength of the bequest motive to match the wealth-income ratio for the median household aged 66–75. We solve and
simulate both models at an annual frequency.
52
Table 7: Basic expenditure share in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model
Percentile of consumption Age
26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75
Panel A: Consumer Expenditure Survey (Stockholders only)
0–25 58 59 57 60 64
(0.9) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.9)
25–50 50 51 49 52 55
(0.9) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.8)
50–75 41 46 44 46 46
(0.9) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.9)
75–100 33 38 35 34 36
(1.0) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8) (0.9)
Top 5 26 30 27 28 29
(2.3) (1.6) (1.4) (2.0) (2.1)
All households 47 49 47 49 51
(0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
Panel B: Nonhomothetic life-cycle model
0–25 61 58 60 62 63
25–50 51 49 50 53 54
50–75 44 43 43 45 47
75–100 36 35 35 36 38
Top 5 32 30 30 31 33
All households 47 46 47 49 51
We sort the sample of stockholders in the 1982–2003 CEX into age groups (columns), then
into quartiles of total consumption within each age group and interview year (rows). Panel A
reports the median of the basic expenditure share (i.e., basic consumption as a percentage
of total consumption) with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Panel B reports
the median of the basic expenditure share for households simulated in the nonhomothetic
life-cycle model.
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Table 8: Portfolio share in the life-cycle model
Percentile of net worth Age
26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75
Panel A: Survey of Consumer Finances (Stockholders only)
0–25 25 23 19 18 15
(7.9) (12.5) (3.9) (1.1) (1.0)
25–50 21 19 22 20 16
(0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8)
50–75 23 25 30 30 24
(1.0) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7)
75–100 40 44 51 47 44
(0.7) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
Top 5 61 67 68 65 65
(1.2) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
All households 26 28 30 29 22
(1.9) (2.6) (0.8) (0.3) (0.3)
Panel B: Nonhomothetic life-cycle model
0–25 100 29 19 17 15
25–50 67 32 25 23 19
50–75 49 35 31 28 21
75–100 43 42 39 34 24
Top 5 42 44 43 36 26
All households 63 35 28 25 20
Panel C: Homothetic life-cycle model
0–25 100 47 32 26 22
25–50 100 44 32 27 23
50–75 77 42 32 27 24
75–100 60 40 32 28 25
Top 5 55 40 32 28 25
All households 90 43 32 27 23
We sort the sample of stockholders in the 1989–2004 Survey of Consumer Finances into age
groups (columns), then into quartiles of net worth within each age group and interview year
(rows). Panel A reports the median of the portfolio share (i.e., risky assets as a percentage
of net worth) with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Panel B (Panel C) reports the
median of the portfolio share for households simulated in the nonhomothetic (homothetic)
life-cycle model.
54
Table 9: Portfolio share in the life-cycle model with unemployment risk
Percentile of net worth Age
26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75
Panel A: Survey of Consumer Finances (Stockholders only)
0–25 25 23 19 18 15
(7.9) (12.5) (3.9) (1.1) (1.0)
25–50 21 19 22 20 16
(0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8)
50–75 23 25 30 30 24
(1.0) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7)
75–100 40 44 51 47 44
(0.7) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
Top 5 61 67 68 65 65
(1.2) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
All households 26 28 30 29 22
(1.9) (2.6) (0.8) (0.3) (0.3)
Panel B: Nonhomothetic life-cycle model
0–25 7 22 18 17 15
25–50 19 29 25 23 19
50–75 24 33 31 28 21
75–100 27 38 40 34 24
Top 5 27 40 43 36 26
All households 20 30 28 25 20
Panel C: Homothetic life-cycle model
0–25 50 46 32 26 22
25–50 91 43 32 26 23
50–75 74 42 32 27 23
75–100 59 40 32 28 24
Top 5 54 39 33 28 25
All households 71 42 32 27 23
We sort the sample of stockholders in the 1989–2004 Survey of Consumer Finances into age
groups (columns), then into quartiles of net worth within each age group and interview year
(rows). Panel A reports the median of the portfolio share (i.e., risky assets as a percentage
of net worth) with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Panel B (Panel C) reports the
median of the portfolio share for households simulated in the nonhomothetic (homothetic)
life-cycle model. The probability of unemployment in the model is 0.5%.
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Figure 1: Optimal consumption policy in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model
The figure shows the optimal consumption policy at age 50 for a life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice model with
nonhomothetic utility. The policy variables are basic consumption (b = B/P ) and luxury consumption (Ql = QL/P ), both
expressed in units of basic consumption and normalized by permanent income. The state variables are normalized cash-on-hand
(w = W/P ) and permanent income (P ). The household receives stochastic labor income from age 26 through 65 and retirement
income from age 66 through 76. Table 6 reports the preference and income parameters of the model.
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Figure 2: Optimal portfolio policy in the nonhomothetic life-cycle model
The figure shows the optimal portfolio policy at age 50 for a life-cycle consumption and
portfolio-choice model with nonhomothetic utility. The policy variable is the portfolio share
(a). The state variables are normalized cash-on-hand (w = W/P ) and permanent income
(P ). The household receives stochastic labor income from age 26 through 65 and retirement
income from age 66 through 76. Table 6 reports the preference and income parameters of
the model.
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